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INTRODUCTION

The controversy concerning citation to foreign authorities in
U.S. Supreme Court cases adjudicating constitutional issues has
been exceptionally vehement. On the one hand, Justice Kennedy's
reference to a European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") decision in his majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas' and his reference to foreign law in Roper v. Simmons2 unleashed a veritable
furor culminating in calls for his impeachment' and in proposed
legislation prohibiting federal judges from referring to foreign authorities when adjudicating constitutional cases.4 On the other
hand, several scholars have advanced the view that constitutional
adjudication is or ought to be the same worldwide' while others
have insisted that international norms have been absorbed into,
and internalized, within domestic constitutional law.' Moreover,
even U.S. Supreme Court Justices are closely and vigorously divided over the issue.7
Although much has been written on this controversy,' Professor
Glendon's article in this issue of the Duquesne Law Review' is a
much welcomed addition to the literature for two principal reasons: first, it offers a rich, subtle and complex analysis of the question and does not conclude with a flat "yes" or "no" answer, but
1. 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
2. 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
3. See, e.g., Jane Lampman, Bringing the Case against Judges, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Apr. 13, 2005, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0413/pl5s02usju.html; Dana Milbank, And the Verdict on Justice Kennedy Is: Guilty, WASH. POST, Apr.
9, 2005, at A03.
4. See, e.g., H. R. Res. 372, 110th Cong. (2007); S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005).
5. See DAVID BEATMY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 159-88 (2004) (arguing that the
ultimate goal of all constitutional adjudication is to subject constitutional controversies to
resolution according to the dictates of the principle of proportionality).
6. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalLegal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181,
183-84, 199 (1996).
7. See The Relevance of ForeignLegal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Court Cases: A
Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT'L J. CONST.
L. 519 (2005)(Justice Breyer making the case for; Justice Scalia, the case against).
8. For a sampling of the various positions within the debate, see NORMAN DORSEN, ET
AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS 19-33 (2d ed. 2010).
9. Mary Ann Glendon, ComparativeLaw in the Age of Globalization, 52 DUQ. L. REV. 1
(2014).
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instead with a nuanced approval of the practice for certain purposes in certain cases and a measured disapproval in other cases;
and second, it provides a thorough and enlightening close examination of relevant cases that forces the reader to focus on practical
concerns in addition to engaging with the broader theoretical debates. Furthermore, I agree with much of Professor Glendon's
analysis and with many of her conclusions. Specifically, I share
her insight that good comparative work should be as much about
relevant differences as about relevant identities; that looking to
foreign constitutional systems may be, at times, most useful in
allowing one to better understand her own constitutional system;
that comparative work is inherently perilous as access to foreign
cultures confronts difficult hurdles that are inexistent or attenuated in the case of one's own culture; and, that the comparativist
is almost never likely to achieve the same level of expertise regarding a foreign constitutional system as she has with respect of
her own. In spite of these substantial areas of agreement and of
the fact that I have already weighed in on the overall controversy,'o however, I have accepted the Law Review's kind offer to reply
to Professor Glendon because I have a major disagreement with
her that goes to the heart of her thesis. I believe that the conflict
over citations to foreign authorities is ultimately a sideshow. It is
parasitic on a much larger and enduring controversy involving two
clashing judicial philosophies-not to say ideologies-regarding
the proper bounds of constitutional adjudication that has long bedeviled the Bench, the American polity, and the legal academy.
My claim is essentially that once it is accepted that the main divide is over whether restrictive or expansive judicial interpretation of the U.S. Constitution is optimal, then the foreign authorities citation controversy should recede as a relatively minor area
of disagreement. In other words, except in cases of sheer xenophobia" or of blind preference for what is not American, differ10. See Michel Rosenfeld, Principle or Ideology? A Comparatist Perspective on the U.S.
Controversy over Supreme Court Citations to ForeignAuthorities, 2009 ANALISI E DIRITrO
291; MICHEL ROSENFELD, THE IDENTITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUBJECT: SELFHOOD,
CITIZENSHIP, CULTURE, AND COMMUNITY 119-23 (2010); Michel Rosenfeld, Comparative

Constitutional Analysis in United States Adjudication and Scholarship, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 38 (Michel Rosenfeld and Andrds Saj6,

eds., 2012).
11. See the Oklahoma Sharia Law Amendment, State Question 755 (2010), which was
approved by voters and would have prohibited courts from using or considering Sharia law
when making rulings. A federal judge issued a preliminary injunction against the state
constitutional amendment, and ruled this year that that the amendment's references to
Sharia, or Islamic law, violated the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution, writing
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ences over reliance on foreign materials should be amenable to
being subsumed as instances of the all-encompassing clash between proponents of restrictive constitutional interpretation and
their expansive counterparts.
The controversy over citations to foreign authorities has been
exacerbated by confusion or glossing over what is really at stakea charge from which Professor Glendon is, of course, completely
exempt. In order to identify those forces which place serious issues in play, and to sharpen the contrasts and similarities between Professor Glendon's views and mine, Part I of this Reply
concentrates briefly on the key terms and concepts that figure
most importantly in the controversy, and outlines the principal
features of the contrast between restrictive and expansive philosophies of constitutional interpretation. Part II revisits the cases
discussed by Professor Glendon and briefly discusses a few others
to highlight the differences between her approach and mine. Finally, Part III lays the legitimate scope and limitations of citations
to foreign authorities in light of the broader conflict over judicial
interpretation, to which I claim constitutional interpretation is
subordinate.
I. RESTRICTIVE VERSUS EXPANSIVE PHILOSOPHIES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION AND THEIR IMPACT OVER
CITATIONS TO FOREIGN AUTHORITIES

Given the vituperative tone of its most strident critics, one
might think that judicial citation to foreign authorities is a sign of
betrayal of the U.S. Constitution in favor of foreign constitutions
or of international treaty-based norms, including those to which
the U.S. had explicitly refused to adhere.1 2 Yet, focusing on Justice Kennedy's citations to foreign authorities in Lawrence and in
Roper, it becomes obvious that his concern was confined to consideration of foreign positions bearing in terms of subject-matter on
that "it is abundantly clear that the primary purpose of the amendment was to specifically
target and outlaw Sharia law and to act as a preemptive strike against Sharia law to protect Oklahoma from a perceived 'threat' of Sharia law being utilized in Oklahoma courts."
See also Awad v. Ziriax, CIV-10-1186-M, 2013 WL 4441476, 6 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 15, 2013).
12. For example, the United States is one of only seven U.N. member nations (including Iran, the Sudan and Somalia) to have not ratified the U.N.'s Convention to Eliminate
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and is the only country in the Western Hemisphere and the only industrialized democracy that has not ratified this treaty. See Lisa
Baldez, U.S. Drops the Ball on Women's Rights, CNN (Mar. 8, 2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/08/opinion/baldez-womens-equality-treaty/.
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the constitutional question that the U.S. Supreme Court had to
decide and over which there had been a longstanding, vigorous
domestic controversy. Specifically, in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy
had a twofold purpose for referring to the ECtHR and a UK parliamentary special report on criminalization of homosexual sex:
first, to refute, based on reference to actual positions held in contemporary Western Europe, the sweeping statements concerning
Western civilization's condemnation of homosexuality made by
Chief Justice Burger in Bowers;13 and second, to draw additional
support for the position already articulated without reliance on
foreign authorities by the four dissenting justices in Bowers."
This took place in the context of changing attitudes regarding homosexuality within the U.S. from 1986 until 2003, and of the fact
that Justice Powell, who was in the majority in Bowers, revealed
upon his retirement from the Court in 1987 that his vote in that
case had probably been wrong." Accordingly, it strains credulity
to maintain that the reference to Europe had any decisive effect on
the reversal of the constitutional jurisprudence in Lawrence. At
best, the European reference in question was meant to buttress
the already articulated argument in favor of one of the two contending judicial positions on the constitutional issue at stake,
which had already been clearly drawn out in Bowers.
Justice Kennedy's reference to foreign authority in Roper was
certainly more dramatic: the U.S. stood alone in the world together with Somalia in refusing to ratify international covenants prohibiting the execution of those who committed capital crimes between the ages of sixteen and eighteen." No doubt, focus on the
United States' isolation on this issue and on its pairing with Somalia would provide added fodder for U.S. opponents of the execution of juvenile offenders and put proponents of the constitutional
legitimacy of the practice on the defensive." Notwithstanding
13.
14.
shall,
15.

See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196-97 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
See id. at 199-220 (Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Brennan, Justice Marand Justice Stevens join, dissenting).
See Henry J. Abraham, Lewis FranklinPowell, Jr,THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Kermit L. Hall, ed, 2005).

16. Roper, 543 U.S at 576. The U.S. and Somalia were the only countries that failed to
ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the U.S. entered reservations to
other covenants, including the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR") to refuse acceptance of prohibitions on the execution ofjuvenile offenders. Id.
17. Justice Scalia's dissent in Roper, though dismissive in tone is indicative of a defensive attitude in substance, particularly in his chastising the UK for its "submission to the
jurisprudence of European courts dominated by continental jurists" and his drawing attention to the UKs abandonment of the trial by jury requirement in cases involving serious
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this, in Justice Kennedy's view, the reference was meant for a relatively much more modest purpose: "The opinion of the world
community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.""8
Professor Glendon criticizes Justice Kennedy, who in 1989 was the
fifth vote" in favor of upholding the constitutionality of the very
practice challenged in Roper, for having changed his mind and for
having adopted a more activist role after much exposure to foreign
law.20 Justice Kennedy, for his part, stresses in his opinion that
since 1990, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, and China abolished the death
penalty for juveniles. 2 ' Perhaps, upon reflecting on this development, Justice Kennedy paused to look inward and revisited the
American debate on the issue that had divided his Court five to
four in 1989. Be that as it may, it is clear that the debate in question is closely associated with the different judicial philosophies of
the judges involved. Justice Scalia's originalism, as he makes
clear in his dissent in Roper, requires that the judge interpret
"cruel and unusual punishment" as it was understood in 1791
when the Eighth Amendment was adopted.2 2 And under that
standard no present day foreign view could be relevant, but for
that matter neither would any prevailing view within the U.S.
unless it took hold by 1791. Hence, if ninety percent of the U.S.
population and the legislatures of forty-nine states were to find
the execution of juvenile offenders morally repulsive, but a single
state by a bare majority adopted such a law and American society
had accepted such punishment as just and fair in 1791, then a logically consistent originalist would have to uphold that single
state's law as constitutional. On the other hand, for a nonoriginalist who believes that what is deemed "cruel and unusual"
must be assessed in terms of currently prevalent social mores, a
virtually unanimous rejection of a particular punishment outside

crimes. 543 U.S. at 626-27. One may wonder what connection there may be between these
matters and determining whether executing juvenile offenders amounts to a "cruel and
unusual punishment" which is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See infra Part II.B.1 for further discussion of this point.
18. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
19. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
20. Glendon, supra note 9, at 6.
21. Roper, 543 U.S. at 577.
22. Consistent with that originalist view, the execution of a seven-year-old would be
currently constitutional. See id. at 587 (Stevens, J., and Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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the U.S. should at least warrant some inward inquiry and reflection, if not some downright reconsideration.
As briefly mentioned already, the key distinction in the present
context is that between an expansive and a restrictive judicial philosophy. That distinction, as I conceive it here, transcends the
ones between originalists and non-originalists2 3 and between politically conservative and politically progressive judges. 24 It is certainly true that a restrictive judicial approach will leave more
room for majoritarian decision-making than an expansive one.2 5
Take, for example, the expansive view of the majority justices in
Griswold v. Connecticut,26 who recognized an unenumerated constitutional right to privacy, and contrast it to the restrictive view
of Justice Black, who in his dissent made it clear that, in his interpretation, the Constitution did not protect a right of privacy,
and that hence no law, no matter how silly or personally offensive,
could be struck down on privacy grounds.2 7 Now, consistent with
the expansive majority view in Griswold, one may certainly argue
that it would be both legitimate and fruitful to look to foreign authorities in the context of judicially handling a privacy issue for
the first time in the U.S. courts, if privacy had already been the
subject of well-reasoned judicial decisions abroad. 28 But, of course,
no such possibility for consultation would arise if Justice Black's
restrictive view had prevailed. In short, had the U.S. Constitution
been held not to protect any privacy right, then no consultation of
23. There is no inherent incompatibility between originalism and an expansive judicial
philosophy as legitimacy of the latter as opposed to that of its restrictive counterpart would
depend on the actual views of the framers, ratifiers of the Constitution, and/or of the understandings of the latter's contemporaries.
24. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the Roberts Court and its (politically) conservative majority have been characterized as being among the most judicially activist
ones. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Supreme Court-OctoberTerm 2009 Forward:Conservative
JudicialActivism, 44 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 863, 863 (2011).
25. I deliberately use "majoritarian" rather than "democratic" as some conceptions of
democracy require the protection of certain anti-majoritarian rights as a prerequisite to the
establishment of a functioning and viable democracy. See Australian Capital Television v.
The Commonwealth of Australia, 177 C.L.R. 106 (High Court of Australia 1992) (even in
the absence of a bill of rights in Australia, the High Court invalidated a law restricting
certain speech immediately prior to an election, on the grounds that a genuine democracy
requires free discussion of political alternatives before votes are cast).
26. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).

27.

Id. at 508-10.

28. For example, in a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court was confronted with the
obligation to decide on the merits whether there is a constitutional right to same-sex marriage, it would make sense for the justices to consult (for both similarities and differences)
the already existing well-reasoned decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada and the Constitutional Court of South Africa. See Reference re Same-Sex Marriage,3 S.C.R. 698 (2004);
Ministerof Home Affairs v. Fourie, 1 SA 524 (CC 2006).
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foreign authorities on the subject would seem either relevant or
appropriate.
Professor Glendon's argument against citation of foreign authorities in cases like Lawrence and Roper is principally based on two
considerations: first, a plea in favor of a restrictive conception of
judicial review;29 and second, a preference for judicial deference to
democratic decision-making through elected officials wherever
possible. 0 Moreover, Professor Glendon seeks to reinforce her argument by emphasizing how difficult it is to amend the U.S. Constitution as compared to those of most other Western democracies." Granting all that, it seems clear that it is the restrictive
conception of the legitimate role of judges combined with the large
role reserved for legislators in Professor Glendon's vision that accounts above all else for her mistrust of citations to foreign authorities. This seems unmistakably confirmed by her endorsement of
the citations at stake in cases such as Washington v. Glucksberg3 2
where, in her assessment, the foreign reference is used to buttress
judicial deference to the legislator's choice.3 3
Even under the most restrictive views of the proper judicial role,
such as those articulated by Robert Bork, there is necessarily
some room left-as narrow as it may be-for legitimate antimajoritarian adjudication in constitutional cases.3 4 For example,
no genuine originalist who espouses a restrictive judicial philosophy would deny that the First Amendment requires judicial invalidation of a law endorsed by a political majority (however large it
may be) criminalizing the expression of citizen support for the policy objectives espoused by a minority of elected representatives in
the relevant legislature. Moreover, whereas proponents of the
restrictive view may seek to restrain jidicial discretion even within the confines of legitimate anti-majoritarian constitutional adjudication-through requiring strict conformity to original intent or
original meaning and strict confinement to the plain meaning of
the text of the Constitution 35 -it defies reason to assume that
there will not be some instances in which a judge will both be
29. See Glendon, supra note 9, at 14.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 15.

32. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
33. See Glendon, supra note 9, at 13.
34. See Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 Ind.

L.J. 1, 6-7 (1971).
35.

See Justice Scalia's dissent in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608 (2005).
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called upon to render an anti-majoritarian decision and have some
legitimate room for discretion in choosing among plausible outcomes for the case before her. Indeed, original intent may not always be clear and original meaning may at times be contested rather than transparent.36
Professor Glendon's second consideration evoked above, namely
her preference for judicial deference to democratic decisionmaking, particularly in view of how difficult it is to amend the
Constitution, may well seem on target upon first impression. Upon further analysis, however, once it is admitted that some constitutional rights are at least in part anti-majoritarian and that it is
for judges to uphold them against majoritarian infringements,
then under-protection of the rights in question seems no more justified than over-protection. Moreover, the difficulty in overcoming
judicial error, be it due to omission or to overreach, through a constitutional amendment would be as serious in cases of overly restrictive judicial interpretations as in those of overly expansive
ones. This can be illustrated in terms of the gender-based equality
issue under the Equal Protection Clause adjudicated in United
States v. Virginia." At stake in that case was whether V1VII, an
elite state military college in Virginia was constitutionally entitled
to persist in its traditional policy of being exclusively open to
men." The Court in an opinion written by Justice Ginsburg held
that VMI's men-only policy was unconstitutional.3 1 Justice Ginsburg stressed that "inherent differences" between men and women
are "cause for celebration," but not for "denigration" or for "artificial constraints" based on sex.40 In contrast, in his dissent Justice
Scalia argued that VMI's policy was constitutional and that the
exclusion of women from the college's "adversative" approach was
36. It is plain that the contemporary understanding of key constitutional concepts such
as "Due Process" or "Equal Protection" are highly contested-one need only consider the
sharp differences between the majority and the dissents in Bowers and Lawrence as well
as in the context of Equal Protection in the sharply divided affirmative action decisions by
the Court. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). Why assume that eighteenth century America was any less divided over the meaning of "due process" or nineteenth century America over that of "equal protection"? Also, at some crucial constitutional
crossroads, the most ardent defenders of originalism confront the unpalatable choice of
having to veer away from their commitment in order to avoid embarrassment. See David
Strauss, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 78 (2010) (arguing that the constitutional invalidation
of racial segregation in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) contradicts the
original intent behind the Fourteenth Amendment).

37.

518 U.S. 515 (1996).

38. Id. at 519.
39. Id. at 546.
40. Id. at 533.
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not violative of the latter's equality rights.4 1 Clearly, if Justice
Scalia were right, then the Court would have exceeded its antimajoritarian mandate and unduly trampled on the democratic
rights of Virginians. But had Justice Scalia been in the majority
and Justice Ginsburg proven to have been right, then the Court
would have failed to honor the legitimate right of women to constitutional equality to the full extent warranted. Both of these arguably plausible outcomes would be equally objectionable, and neither of them would presumably stand a better chance of correction
through successful adoption of a constitutional amendment.
There is one further argument from democracy that seemingly
buttresses Professor Glendon's position in privacy right cases such
as Lawrence. Going back to Griswold, the constitutional right to
privacy has been construed as an unenumerated right derived
from the Ninth Amendment, which specifies that the rights specified in the Bill of Rights are not exclusive4 2 and as a (substantive)
"due process" right under the Fourteenth Amendment.4 3 To refute
charges that they were engaging in pure judicial subjectivism, the
Justices who appealed to either of the two above-mentioned
amendments insisted that the privacy right involved and its proper contours were so deeply rooted in "the traditions and [collective]
conscience" of the American people as to be "ranked as fundamental."
In the same vein, references were made to "basic values
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'"4 5 and to the traditions
of the "English-speaking peoples."4 6 The "collective conscience,"
"basic values" and "traditions" at stake have been interpreted as
being both historically grounded4 7 and as being democratic in the
sense of being imprinted in, and endorsed by, a vast majority of
Americans." Consistent with this, the proper sources of inquiry
for judges adjudicating privacy rights cases would appear to be
41. Id. at 535.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (1791). See the concurring opinion by Justice Goldberg in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488-93 (1965).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (1868). See Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499-502.
44. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J. concurring).
46. Id. at 512 n.4 (Black, J., dissenting).
47. The Court in Griswold stresses that regarding marriage "we deal with a right of
privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than our political parties, older than our school
system.," 318 U.S. at 486.
48. This view has been expressed by Justice Scalia. See The Relevance of Foreign Legal
Materials in U.S. Constitutional Court Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin
Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, supra note 7, at 526, 533-34.
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confined to American history (which would incorporate some pre1787 English history) and American values and convictions endorsed by relevant majorities within the country.
This, however, is only one among the prevailing interpretations
of the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment in the context of privacy.
As Justice Harlan has explained, what the judge confronts is the
need to strike a balance between individual liberty and the demands of organized society. That balance is struck by this country
having regard for what history teaches are the traditions from
which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke.
That tradition is a living thing.49
Thus, once tradition is regarded as changing and the focus is
shifted from the values held by the majority to a proper balance
between individual autonomy and societal objectives, the legitimate task of the judge expands. Indeed, distilling the relevant
course of an evolving tradition requires reconciling the present
with the past instead of merely considering past mores as frozen
in time. Furthermore, in order to strike a balance between individual rights and societal interests, the judge cannot rely exclusively on majoritarian considerations, but must instead find a defensible way to harmonize majoritarian and anti-majoritarian
values.
Debate continues over the appropriate level of abstraction at
which tradition ought to be gauged for purposes of assessing the
sustainability of constitutionalizing a particular liberty interest.
This debate sharply divided the justices in Michael H. v. Gerald
D.o At stake was whether a genetic father who had had a child
with a woman married to another enjoyed a constitutional right to
visitation."' A closely divided Court held that there was no such
right, and writing for a plurality Justice Scalia asserted that, taking the relevant tradition at "the most specific level,"52 out-ofwedlock fathers enjoyed no constitutional right to visitation. In
his dissent, Justice Brennan differed sharply: under Justice Scalia's criterion, only those traditions protected by legislative majorities would be vindicated, thus making constitutionalization re49. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan
relied on his dissent in Poe to elaborate his position in Griswold.
50. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). For an extended discussion of the controversy over the appropriate level of abstraction for determining the meaning and scope of a tradition, see Rosenfeld, supra note 10, at 78-81.
51. 491 U.S. at 113.
52. 491 U.S. at 128 n.6.
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dundant." For Justice Brennan, the relevant tradition had to be
conceived at a much higher level of abstraction, namely that of the
relationship between parent and child. Justice Brennan stressed
that in a pluralistic society like the then-prevailing one in the
U.S., there were different conceptions of the family and of the good
life. More specifically, two important changes had taken place
between the late eighteenth century and the late twentieth century: paternity could be scientifically established with near certainty
in 1989 but not in 1791 or 1868; and the model of the traditional
family had given way to a current proliferation of intimate association arrangements.
Michael H. did not involve citations to foreign authorities, but
under Justice Brennan's approach it could have easily included
some. Indeed, once one combines conceptions of tradition at higher levels of abstraction with a construction of the latter in relation
to liberty or privacy rights understood as requiring some measure
of anti-majoritarian judicial protection, there seems to be no impediment to references to traditions commonly shared with societies beyond the U.S.-or at least with those other countries that
are English speaking." Had there been a judicial decision on the
evolution of intimate associations and their impact on the relationship between parent and child in a society similar to that of
the U.S. taken at a high enough level of abstraction-say Australia, (Anglophone) Canada or the UK-then it would seem perfectly
appropriate for a judge imbued with Justice Brennan's judicial
philosophy to consider and, if she found it sufficiently illuminating, to make reference to the said foreign decision. Once again, as
in the other situations discussed above, the key divide proves to be
the one between restrictive and expansive approaches to constitutional interpretation.

53.
54.
55.

Id. at 140-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 142.
Id. at 141.

56.

See ROSENFELD, THE IDENTITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUBJECT, supra note 10, at

80.
57.

See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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II. REVISITING RELEVANT U.S. SUPREME COURT CONSTITUTIONAL
CASES WITH A BEARING ON THE CONTROVERSY OVER CITATIONS TO
FOREIGN AUTHORITIES

Even under an expansive judicial philosophy, not all references
to foreign authorities would be justified, and some would be to underscore differences rather than to stress similarities. In some
cases, the constitutions of two countries being considered may be
so diametrically opposed on a subject-for example, a constitution
establishing an official state religion versus one prescribing strict
separation between state and religion-that there ought to be a
presumption against the benefits of comparison outweighing the
pitfalls. In other cases, contextual differences may be so pronounced-again, for example, millennial ethnic strife versus
longstanding ethnic homogeneity-that the same presumption
also ought to prevail. Moreover, in some cases involving important contextual variants, references to foreign authorities may
be fruitful to draw attention to differences that buttress the case
for jurisprudential divergences. For instance, the constitutional
protection of Holocaust denial in the U.S. stands in contrast with
its criminalization in Germany, and this difference tracks the contrast between Germany's Nazi past and the lack of any significant
Nazi influence in the U.S."
A.

National and TransnationalComparisons,Levels ofAbstraction and the Dynamic between Analogical and Contextual
Reasoning

Just as in a purely national setting, comparisons across time or
space depend, for relevance and persuasiveness, on approaching
that which is to be compared at an appropriate level of abstraction. That emerged vividly in Michael H. (discussed above) and
played a key role in Griswold, in which the Court derived a twentieth century constitutional marital right to use contraceptives
from an eighteenth century deeply rooted commitment to the
sanctity of marriage that preceded the adoption of the 1787 U.S.
Constitution."9 Similarly, in a transnational context in which a
58.

See Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in ConstitutionalJurisprudence:A Comparative

Analysis, in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH: RETHINKING REGULATION AND

RESPONSE 242, 244 (Michael Herz and Peter Molnar, eds 2012).
59. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). Whereas the sanctity of
marriage was firmly embedded in eighteenth century U.S. tradition, marital use of contraceptives was certainly not. See Brandon R. Johnson, Emerging Awareness' After the Emer-
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comparison regarding the death penalty or the criminalization of
consensual sex is at stake, consider, for example, the cases of two
individuals, one an American the other a Frenchman, facing punishment for the same kind of murder or for engaging in the same
kind of homosexual sex. Should the comparison in question focus
mainly on the differences between nationalities, cultures, constitutional, legal and political systems? Or should they instead underscore the common concerns in two constitutional secular democracies steeped in similar Christian and individualistic traditions, confronting the need to reconcile punishment and respect
for human dignity and to find the proper balance between individual privacy and entrenched social mores?
As made manifest given the divisions among justices in Griswold and Michael H., there are likely disagreements over the optimal level of abstraction at which a particular comparison across
time or space ought to be approached in the context of constitutional review. And that applies to both domestic and transnational comparisons. The only important difference between the two in
this respect is that in the national context, comparison seems appropriate even at the lowest conceivable level of abstraction, as
indicated by Justice Scalia in Michael H.c0 That does not appear
to be the case in a transnational context. Indeed, in contrast to
his stance in Michael H., in Roper Justice Scalia forecloses comparison at any level of abstraction: "Either America's principles
are its own, or they follow the world; one cannot have it both
ways."
Beyond that, however, there may be judicial agreement that
transnational comparison is appropriate, but disagreement about
the right level of abstraction at which it would be best to tackle it
in a particular case. Thus, Justice O'Connor, who like Justice
Scalia dissented in Roper, agreed with Justice Kennedy that reference to foreign authorities in that case was entirely appropriate.6 2
Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor did not go along with the Court's
majority as she deemed the differences separating the U.S. from
the countries that had abolished the death penalty for juvenile
offenders to be greater than the similarities between them.6 3
gence of Roberts: Reasonable Societal Reliance in Substantive Due Process Inquiry, 71
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1587, 1619 (2006).
60. 491 U.S. at 123-30.
61. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 627 n. 9 (2005).
62. Id. at 604-05.
63. Id.
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Disputes concerning the appropriate level of abstraction for
purposes of undertaking comparisons across time and space in
both national and transnational settings may be resolved depending on how expansive the judicial philosophy involved may be.
Significantly, both in the determination of which level of abstraction is likely to be optimal for a particular interpretive purpose,
and in sorting out the relevant importance of clusters of similarities and differences within a chosen level of abstraction, heavy
reliance must be placed on the dynamic between analogical and
contextual reasoning in judicial interpretation.6 4 That dynamic,
moreover, plays a key role in common law adjudication as both
judges and litigants must sort out what is analogous and disanalogous in previous judicial decisions that might constitute precedents in the case at hand. Very frequently, disanalogy is established or reinforced through ever greater contextualization." Consistent with this, absent inherent hostility or unthinking attachment to foreign countries, the place and scope of citations to foreign authorities in constitutional adjudication should primarily
depend on general principles of judicial interpretation. As we already saw, the difference between expansive and restrictive judicial philosophies is very important in this respect. But so are different conceptions of the proper uses of processes of abstraction
and competing views on how to optimize the balance between analogical and contextual considerations. With this in mind, let us
now briefly revisit the cases considered by Professor Glendon, as
well as a few additional ones that seem particularly relevant in
the light of the present discussion.
B.

Revisiting the Relevant Cases
1.

Roper

Beginning with Roper, two principal considerations, one inward
looking and the other directed outward, militate in favor of con64. I have characterized the stringing together of similarities as a "metaphoric" process
of interpretation, and uses of contextualization to highlight differences as a "metonymic"
process. Based on that, and for an account of the uses of analogizing and contextualizing
for purposes of developing the judicial account of "tradition" in Griswold and its progeny,
see ROSENFELD, THE IDENTITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUBJECT, supra, note 10, at 73125.
65. See id. at 104-15 (detailing use of contextualization, both historical to highlight
moral objections, and physical, by contrasting homosexual sodomy to "normal" procreative
heterosexual sex, by the justices in the majority in Bowers and in the dissent in Lawrence).
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sidering how the rest of the world has dealt with the question of
the death penalty for juvenile offenders. The inward concern is
dramatically triggered by Justice Kennedy drawing attention to
the U.S. and Somalia being on one side of the divide and the rest
of the world on the other. In view of this, at the very least, American judges ought to go beyond counting the number of states that
provide for the death penalty for juvenile offenders and determine
whether they can mount a cogent and principled positive argument for justifying the conclusion that the punishment in question
is neither "cruel and unusual" nor grossly disproportionate." The
outward concern, on the other hand, should be prompted even if
one does not entertain inward doubts, given the isolation of the
U.S. vis-A-vis the rest of the world on this particular issue. In
view of the near universal condemnation of the punishment involved, the conflict between maintaining respect for the dignity of
the individual (no matter how heinous his crime) and society's
need for proportionate and effective punishment presumably
trumps cultural, political and historical differences. Accordingly,
focus on the relation between the individual, society, the crime
and the punishment across national borders above and beyond the
above-mentioned differences would clearly seem to hit the appropriate level of abstraction. It also follows from this, that the comparison should be undertaken and foreign authorities ought to be
factored in either to alter the national approach or to reaffirm it
fully cognizant of the widespread worldwide criticism of it.
Both Justices Kennedy and O'Connor approach the question
presented in Roper at a level of abstraction congruent with the one
advocated above, and they both insist on the appropriateness of
considering relevant foreign authorities." They differ in their
conclusions, however, at least in part because Justice Kennedy
places greater emphasis on analogical factors and Justice
O'Connor on contextual ones, with the consequence that the former downplays majoritarian considerations while the latter gives
them significantly greater weight. In any event, it is noteworthy
that neither of the two justices invokes the majoritarian versus
anti-majoritarian conundrum to reject consideration of foreign
66. In order to be unconstitutional as "cruel and unusual," a punishment must be grossly disproportionate. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). Cf 1948 UN Universal
Declarationof Human Rights (no one should be subjected to "cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment"); 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 3 (prohibiting "inhuman and degrading" punishment).
67. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578, 604-05.
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authorities. In contrast, Justice Scalia rejects such consideration
on both majoritarian and (categorical) contextual grounds. What
is striking about Justice Scalia's position is not his originalismhe could have filed a dissent comprised of a couple of sentences
stating that since the punishment at issue was not deemed cruel
and unusual in 1791 America, it is without a doubt constitutional
in the twenty-first century-but his seeming runaway contextualism, without any apparent regard for the ongoing dynamic between similarities and differences. As already noted," Justice
Scalia is particularly critical of the UK, which may be the most
similar to the U.S. among the nations of the world and which yet
has abolished the death penalty notwithstanding that a majority
of its citizens may still be in favor of it."
Among the differences that Justice Scalia underscores to support his conclusion that the Court looking to the laws of the UK "is
perhaps the most indefensible part of its opinion," 70 are the UK
submission to the jurisprudence of European courts dominated by
continental judges,71 and its trial of those accused of the most serious crimes without a jury. 72 These are indeed differences among
the two countries and they are certainly apt for use for contextualization. It seems inescapable that Justice Scalia's use of them in
Roper amounts to misplaced and misleading contextualization.
The suggestion is that the UK's attitude toward the death penalty
is untrustworthy because the country has fallen under the sway of
judges whose standards are different from (perhaps even inferior
to?) those of their common law counterparts; and because the UK
seems less concerned than it once was concerning the dignity of
criminal defendants. None of this seems relevant, however, to a
comparison between the U.S. and the UK on the impact of the
death penalty for juvenile offenders on human dignity and society's standards of decency. In terms of the latter issue and of constitutional and human rights-based dignity and societal decency
concerns in general, there actually seems to be little significant
difference between European (continental) and common law judg68. See supra note 17.
69. See The Relevance of ForeignLegal Materials in U.S. ConstitutionalCourt Cases: A
Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, supra note 7, at
529 (Justice Scalia asserting that every public opinion poll in the UK indicates that the
country's people are in favor of the death penalty).
70. Roper, 543 U.S. at 626.
71. Id. at 626-27.
72. Id. at 627.
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es, including American ones.7 3 Similarly beside the point are departures from jury trials in the UK, which does not have the
equivalent of the U.S. Seventh Amendment jury trial guarantee,
and which has departed from jury trials motivated by reliability
and efficiency considerations without any design to weaken or disregard the dignity concerns of criminal defendants."
2.

Lawrence

Turning to Lawrence, what clearly comes to the fore is an evolving "tradition" concerning acceptance and inclusion of homosexuals within the mainstream of society both in the U.S. and in Europe, though not in certain other parts of the world, as noted by
Justice Scalia in his dissent." Three principal positions relating
to criminalization of consensual homosexual sex among adults are
assertively brought forth not only in Lawrence, but also in Bowers
and in Dudgeon, the ECtHR case cited by Justice Kennedy. The
first is the (now overwhelmingly discredited) position that homosexual sex is somehow devious, abnormal or dangerous based on
beliefs that homosexuals are prone to having sex with minors."
The second position is the religious condemnation of homosexual
sex by the West's three major religions, and the moral condemnation derived from the latter." And, finally the third position is
73. See generally Michel Rosenfeld, ComparingConstitutionalReview By The European
Court of Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court, 4 INT'L J. OF CONST. L. 618 (2006). There are
certain rights, such as social and welfare rights, with respect to which there are important
differences in approach between common law and continental judges. There are also differences in approaches to constitutional interpretation that separate the U.S. from other
common and civil law countries, such as the inclusion of limitation clauses in bills of rights,
e.g., Section 1 of the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights, that have no equivalent in the U.S.
However, none of these differences have any discernible bearing on the issues involved in
Roper.
74. See US CONST., amend. VII (1791).
75. See R v. Twomey, [2011] EWCA (Crim) 8, [2011] All E.R. 136.
76. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 597-98 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 EHHR 149, 45 Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser. A) (1981).
78. See Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in Bowers citing to Blackstone's reprehensible dictum describing homosexual sex as "the infamous crime against nature," an
offense "of deeper malignity" than rape, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S., 186196-97 (1986);
Judge Zekia's dissenting opinion in Dudgeon, asserting that "all civilized countries" have
"till recently" penalized homosexual sodomy "and akin unnatural practices", 4 EHRR, at
para. 2; and Judge Matscher's dissenting opinion in Dudgeon claiming that "it is well
known" that homosexual relations with minors "is a widespread tendency," 4 EHRR, I(b).
79. See Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in Bowers referring to condemnation
of sodomy in "Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards," 478 U.S. at 196; Judge Zekia's
dissenting opinion in Dudgeon specifying that "Christian and Moslem religions are all
united in the condemnation of homosexual relations and of sodomy", 4 EHRR, at para. 1.
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that asserted by the dissenters in Bowers, the majority in Lawrence and that in Dudgeon: homosexuals are as entitled as heterosexuals to conduct their intimate sex life in full privacy without
interference by the state."o Moreover, this last position is backed
by a direct refutation of the assertions made by proponents of the
first position. Indeed, already many years before Bowers, professional associations of psychologists and of public health specialists
had repudiated earlier stances that characterized homosexual sex
as deviant and officially reclassified it as normal.8 '
Even without any reference to foreign law, Bowers and Lawrence highlight two fault lines among the principal judicial approaches manifest in the various opinions filed in the two cases.
The first of these fault lines is the predictable one between restrictive and expansive judicial approaches, but the second one is much
more remarkable as it pits two expansive views on privacy rights
against one another. Under a restrictive view, such as that of Justice Black in Griswold, there is no more a constitutional right to
homosexual intimacy than there is one to marital privacy.8 But
that is not the case for Justice White, whose view was expansive
in that he concurred with the majority in Griswold and yet he
wrote the opinion of the Court in Bowers. It may seem that Justice White was inconsistent with respect to these two cases, but
closer analysis does not bear that conclusion out.
In relation to traditions entitled to constitutional protection,
Justice White distinguishes marriage and contraception in the
context of marital sex, on the one hand, from homosexual sex, on
the other." In contrast, the dissenters in Bowers and the majority
in Lawrence place homosexual sex on the same side of the ledger
as they do marriage and contraception, and treat all three as
equally deserving of constitutional protection." What differentiate the latter justices from Justice White are not their equally expansive judicial approaches, but the fact that they rely primarily
on analogical reasoning, while he correspondingly engages in con-

80. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79; Bowers, 478 U.S. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 4
EHHR at para. 69.
81. The dissenting justices in Bowers cited the amici briefs to that effect of the American Psychological Association and of the American Public Health Association, 478 U.S. at
203.
82. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 509.
83. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91.
84. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78; Bowers, 478 U.S. at 217-18.
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textual reasoning." Once homosexual sex is determined to be
normal by the relevant experts, then all intimate relationships
involving consensual sex among adults should be deemed equivalent for purposes of determining what is analogous today to what
marriage represented in the eighteenth century. This conclusion
is reinforced by the Court's extension of protection to the kind of
intimate sex recognized in Griswold to apply to non-marital heterosexual sex in Eisenstadt." Justice White and those in his camp
in Bowers, however, contextualize homosexual sex by referring to
it in historical terms and refusing to approach it at the same high
level of abstraction, as they were willing to tackle marriage, contraception and non-marital heterosexual sex.
Can this inconsistency in the use of levels of abstraction be justified? Presumably, it cannot, unless positions one or two listed
above, involving respectively categorical objections based on the
conviction that homosexual sex is in some relevant sense not as
normal as its heterosexual counterpart and religious objections
are advanced as reasons for the seeming discrepancy relating to
levels of abstraction. Reliance on religious objections is problematic to the extent that the latter also extends to heterosexual nonmarital sex and, in some cases, even to contraception. Reliance on
the conviction that homosexual sex is not normal is also questionable to the extent the overwhelming weight of expert opinion
strongly militated against this position already more than a decade before Bowers was decided."
In view of the preceding observations, the three judicial approaches that happened to weigh in on the American constitutional debate over the criminalization of homosexual sex managed to
elaborate distinct positions that are independent from any foreign
authorities or influences. Moreover, the restrictive approach had
no need or use for foreign authorities. The two expansive positions did have such use, however, but each for its own reasons.
85. For a detailed account of the contrasting analogical and contextual-or, in other
words, metaphoric and metonymic-approaches in Bowers and Lawrence, see ROSENFELD,
THE IDENTITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUBJECT, supra note 10, at 104-15.
86. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
87. For example, in 1974 the American Psychological Association changed its position
to declare that homosexuality is not per se a mental disorder, and "[s]ince 1974, the American Psychological Association (APA) has opposed stigma, prejudice, discrimination, and
violence on the basis of sexual orientation and has taken a leadership role in supporting the
equal rights of lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals." See Resolution on Appropriate Responses to Sexual Orientation Distress and Change Efforts, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION, http://www.apa.org/about/policy/sexual-orientation.aspx (last visited Dec. 8,
2013).
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The majority justices in Bowers who were bent on contextualizing
to reinforce their approach, but also seemingly (whether intentional or not) to dissimulate the inconsistencies produced by their
shifts in levels of abstraction, invoked past foreign authorities.
They did this to overplay the historical, long passed, groundings of
the tradition at stake while underplaying its more recent evolution and adaptation. Thus, Chief Justice Burger's allusion to millennial Judeo-Christian morality and to Blackstone's characterization of homosexual sex as being "against nature"" places the U.S.
in a Western civilization context that long predates it. The allusion also aligns the U.S. to the legal system of which it is the heir,
by referring to a common tradition invoked by one of its most celebrated commentators. What this reference to foreign authorities
overemphasizes is continuity; what it dissimulates is the substantial erosion of positions one and two above within the precincts of
the U.S. Supreme Court and within the larger social landscape
comprising the relevant experts and American society at large.
In contrast, Justice Kennedy's reference to foreign authorities in
Lawrence, as already noted," had both a negative and a positive
purpose. The negative purpose, which seems unobjectionable and
which Justice Scalia has also used to the same end in both Roper
and Lawrence, is to dispel the erroneous impression concerning
current attitudes in the rest of the Western world conveyed by
Chief Justice Burger in Bowers. The positive purpose, on the other hand, far from seeking dissimulation, confirms and amplifies
the judgment of the majority in Lawrence in ways that are uniquely relevant and weighty. Both Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Kennedy agree that the question concerning a constitutional privacy right covering homosexual sex arises in a cultural, religious,
moral, and political setting that encompasses an entire Western
tradition, of which the U.S. is a part. All three positions alluded
to above have equally gathered support throughout this broader
culture (at least in Western Europe and North America). The
"tradition" in question has evolved in the same direction, with the
third position now predominant (and the other two in full retreato) in constitutional cultures that protect certain anti88. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
89. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
90. To avoid misunderstanding, the position based on religion is clearly in rapid retreat
in the context of constitutional reasons for upholding laws discriminating against homosexuals. This does not imply any change within the ambit of those religions that forbid
homosexual sex.
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majoritarian fundamental rights against majoritarian encroachments.
Accordingly, Justice Kennedy's citation in Lawrence to the ECtHR's Dudgeon is not only apt, but probative and quite persuasive
on the question of the evolution of the commonly shared Western
"tradition" regarding the proper relationship between homosexual
sex and the right to privacy in one's intimate life. Justice Kennedy does not allude to this in Lawrence, but the invalidation of
Northern Ireland's criminalization of homosexual sex was only
decreed by the ECtHR after the clearing of a major hurdle set by
that court. The court had to reconcile respect for the rights protected by the ECHR and the divergences in constitutional, legal,
political and ideological culture that set apart the (now) fortyseven European countries subject to the ECHR. The hurdle in
question has been established through use of the judicially devised
standard known as "the margin of appreciate on."' In a nutshell,
this standard is designed to allow the ECtHR to insure that all
countries party to the ECHR equally enforce the core of an applicable right under the Convention, while leaving room for differences and divergences meant to accommodate the diversity of cultures comprised within the forty-seven members of the Council of
Europe at the periphery. In response to the complaint lodged
against the UK for maintaining the criminalization of homosexual
sex among consenting adults in Ireland while having decriminalized it in the rest of the country, the UK invoked the margin of
appreciation in an endeavor to convince the ECtHR that the criminalization at stake was not violative of Article 8 of the Convention
(which provides, in relevant part, that "Everyone has the right to
respect for his private and family life . . .").92 While acknowledging
that Northern Ireland was more morally and religiously conservative than the rest of the UK,93 the ECtHR refused to allow for any
exemption or deviation based on the margin of appreciation. In so
doing, the ECtHR stated:
As compared with the era when that legislation was enacted,
there is now a better understanding, and in consequence an
increased tolerance, of homosexual behaviour to the extent
that in the great majority of the member States of the Council
91.

For a more extended discussion of this standard, see ROSENFELD, THE IDENTITY OF

THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUBJECT, supra note 10, at 256-57.

92.
93.

See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 EHHR 149, 7 Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser. A) (1981).
Id. para. 57.
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of Europe it is no longer considered to be necessary or appropriate to treat homosexual practices of the kind now in question as in themselves a matter to which the sanctions of the
criminal law should be applied ...
In other words, not only is the trend in the broader world that
shares the same tradition with the US-both in terms of attitudes
toward homosexual sex and of protecting anti-majoritarian fundamental rights-toward decriminalization, but also the change in
this respect has been so thorough and dramatic that a laggard polity such as Northern Ireland can no longer be afforded any margin
for deviation.
3.

Glucksberg

Professor Glendon approves of Chief Justice Rehnquist's reference in Glucksberg" to studies evaluating the Netherlands's experience with physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia in considering whether the challenged Washington's law banning assisted
suicide met minimal scrutiny under the Due Process Clause."
This approval is consistent with Professor Glendon's endorsement
of legislative as opposed to judicial reliance on foreign authorities
because the former do not raise the anti-majoritarian issues that
the latter do." The purpose of the reference to the Dutch experience with assisted suicide was to determine whether the Washington law banning such practice satisfied the threshold of being minimally rational." The Dutch studies taken as a whole were inconclusive, as some asserted that there had been abuses leading to
involuntary euthanasia while others concluded that no such abuses had occurred." Because one of the purposes of the Washington
law was to protect individuals from involuntary euthanasia,0 o the
very inconclusiveness of the Dutch studies lent support to the conclusion that the Washington legislature had acted rationally.
Given the very low threshold under minimal scrutiny, the reference to the Dutch studies added very little. Even had these stud94. Id. para. 60.
95. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 734 (1997).
96. See Glendon, supra note 9, at 12.
97. Id. at 12-13.
98. To satisfy minimum scrutiny, laws must not be arbitrary, capricious or wholly
irrational. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
99. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 785-87.
100. Id. at 782.
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ies been unanimous in showing no abuses, Washington could have
still met its constitutional obligations by arguing that it aimed at
a zero risk of involuntary euthanasia, or that conditions in the
U.S. could not be assumed to be in all relevant respects identical
to those in the Netherlands. The key issue in Glucksberg was
whether there is a constitutional privacy right to control one's
death in the U.S. that would render laws banning assisted suicide
unconstitutional. Had the Court decided in favor of such right,
then the Washington law would have had to be subjected to strict
scrutiny and the inconclusive Dutch studies would have been of no
discernible help. Washington would have to prove a compelling
interest for banning assisted suicide. Dutch studies indicating
that there may or not be abuses in that country would certainly
not satisfy the applicable strict standard.
Reference to foreign authorities in relation to the key issue before the Court in Glucksberg did figure in the Court's opinion by
Chief Justice Rehnquist although this is not mentioned by Professor Glendon. In discussing the evolving trend in the U.S. and
changed conditions due to advances in medicine, the Chief Justice
pointed out that "[olther countries are embroiled in similar debates.""o' Specifically, the Chief Justice cited to a decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada, and legislative action by the British
House of Lords and the parliaments of Australia and New Zealand, all against recognition of a right to assisted suicide.'0 2 in
addition, he also cited a decision by Colombia's Constitutional
Court upholding a right to euthanasia for the terminally ill as the
These
only foreign authority headed in the opposite direction.'
citations are introduced in the course of making the case that
American tradition had not evolved to the point that any recognition of a right to assisted suicide would be warranted.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's citation to foreign authorities in
Glucksberg seems completely similar to that of Justice Kennedy in
Lawrence. The only difference between the two is that Chief Justice Rehnquist has recourse to foreign authority in support of his
refusal to provide a more expansive interpretation of the constitutional right to privacy whereas Justice Kennedy does so for purposes of a more expansive interpretation of that right. Once
again, the citations to foreign authorities play but a secondary
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 718 n.16.
Id.
Id.
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role. The important issue is that between restrictive and expansive approaches-in the case of the comparison at hand, more expansive versus more restrictive conceptions of constitutional
rights as contrasted to expansive versus restrictive judicial philosophies.
4.

Printz

I now turn to cases not considered by Professor Glendon with a
view to sketching a more complete account of the nature and legitimate scope of judicial references to foreign authorities. The first
of these cases is Printz v. United States,'" a federalism case in

which Justice Breyer referred to foreign federal systems in his
dissent. Comparisons in the area of federalism are presumptively
more problematic than those in the area of individual rights as
each constitutional federal arrangement may reflect a sui generis
compromise concerning apportionment of powers, whereas relationships between men and women, or homosexuals and heterosexuals, may well be very similar, if not universally, across a large
number of different polities.'o Nevertheless, as Justice Breyer
illustrates in Printz, comparisons in the area of federalism may be
quite useful, provided they are undertaken at the appropriate level of abstraction.
The issue in Printz was whether the federal government could
enlist state executive personnel to conduct a federally required
computer background check on prospective firearm purchasers
within the relevant state. The Court's majority in an opinion by
Justice Scalia held that the obligation imposed by the federal government on state officials amounted to unconstitutional "federal
commandeering.""o' Justice Breyer, in his dissent, emphasized
that the key federalism issue raised in the case was whether delegation of enforcement to state officials or dispatching federal officials to the state for that purpose would be least intrusive on the
state's sovereignty.'o Pointing out that the U.S. Constitution was
silent on the matter, Justice Breyer referred to the federal systems of Germany, Switzerland and the European Union, which,
though different from one another and from that of the U.S., all
104.

521 U.S. 898, 976 (1997).

105. See Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative
ConstitutionalExperience, 51 DUKE L. J. 223, 273 (2001).
106. 521 U.S. at 925.
107. Id. at 976-77.
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provided empirical evidence that delegation to the executive of the
federated unit proved least intrusive upon the latter's prerogatives."'s Underlying Justice Breyer's reference to foreign federal
systems is the proposition that in spite of the significant differences among these various federal systems and between all the
latter and their American counterpart, they all lend support to the
empirical conclusion that delegation is less intrusive than direct
enforcement by the federal authorities. In this context, the reference to foreign systems involved in Printz seems equivalent to the
common practice of a U.S. state's highest court looking to other
U.S. state courts that have dealt with the issue it is considering
for the first time in order to determine which of the various available alternatives developed in other jurisdictions is most likely to
provide guidance or useful caveats.'0 o
5.

Hate Speech Cases

Finally, I address cases that do not refer to foreign authorities,
but that arguably should have for purposes of achieving a better
look inward that might have led to a change of jurisprudence or to
a strengthening or refinement of the latter. I also deliberately
concentrate exclusively on First Amendment cases, perhaps the
most distinct and deeply entrenched area of American exceptionalism.110 The two cases in question are R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul"n
and Virginia v. Black,112 both involving hate speech against African-Americans. Unlike international treaties, Western Europe
and Canada, which do not afford constitutional protection to racial
hate speech, the U.S. draws the line at speech that incites violence.113
The two cases in question concerned cross burning, long a practice of white supremacists such as those belonging to the Ku Klux
Klan, which has figured as a symbol of virulent racism much like
the swastika has been associated with virulent anti-Semitism." 4
108. Id. at 976.
109. See Chad Flanders, Towards a Theory of Persuasive Authority, 62 OKLA. L. REV 55
(2009).
110. See Robert A. Sedler, An Essay on Freedom of Speech: The United States versus the
Rest of the World, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 377 (2006).
111. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
112. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
113. See Rosenfeld, supra note 58, at 242.
114. The St. Paul ordinance successfully challenged in R.AV. criminalized, among other
things, placing "a burning cross or Nazi swastika" on public or private property. 505 U.S.
at 380.
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In R.A. V., young white extremists placed a burning cross inside
the fenced yard of an African-American family that had moved to
a neighborhood that was in the process of becoming more racially
integrated." In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the cross burning at issue was constitutionally protected
expression, as it did not amount to an incitement to violence.
In Black, a divided Court adjudicated a case comprising two
cross burning incidents, one at a Ku Klux Klan rally attended by
hooded members of the group, and the other by whites not affiliated to the latter group in the yard of an African-American neighbor."' The Virginia statute at stake in this case made it a crime
to burn a cross "with the intent of intimidating any person or
group of persons,""' and provided that a cross burning amounted
to "prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate.""' The Court
held that the "prima facie" presumption was unconstitutional, but
that cross burning with intent to intimidate was not constitutionally protected expression."' Based on that reasoning, the Court
made it clear that consistent with this, the Klan rally, with its
vicious racist rhetoric which unmistakably amounted to an incitement to racial hatred, was protected speech. In Justice
O'Connor's words, it amounted to a protected communication of
"potent symbols of shared group identity and ideology."' 20 The
second cross burning, however, appeared to have been carried out
with an attempt to intimidate, and as such would not be protected
speech.'21
Because intimidation need not involve a threat of, or incitement
to, violence-one can intimidate with threats of ridicule, public
humiliation, social exclusion, and the like-it may seem that
Black is internally inconsistent or at least irreconcilable with
R.A. V. To ward off such a conclusion, Justice O'Connor specified
in Black that throughout its history the Klan has used "cross
burnings .

.

. to communicate threats of violence

."12

Indeed,

115. 505 U.S. at 379.
116. 538 U.S. at 348-52.
117. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (1996).
118. Id.
119. 538 U.S. at 363.
120. Id. at 356.
121. Id. at 350-53. Because of its finding that the Virginia statute's presumption of
intent to intimidate was unconstitutional, the Court could not uphold the conviction of
those responsible for the second cross burning. For purposes of present doctrinal analysis
and critique, however, I will proceed as if the intent to intimidate had been established
without any presumption at play.
122. Id. at 354.
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as cross burnings have been frequently followed by beatings,
lynchings, shootings, and killings of African-Americans, either
they amount to incitements to violence or they create a reasonable
fear in those whom they target of becoming victims of impending
violence.
The link between intimidation and incitement to violence or
reasonable fear of becoming the vic'tim of violence seems logical.
But then, why treat doctrinally differently the rally that whips up
the virulent racist animus that prompts to, and precedes, intimidation and violence? And, what if that rally is not only before
converts, but also before a white audience that far from being intimidated, may be comprised of potential Klan recruits? Furthermore, does Black blur the clear line drawn in R.A.V.? Also does
Black sufficiently account for the concern of the marginalized and
the oppressed who are disproportionately confronted by hatred
and violence?1 23
Significantly, in his dissent in Black, Justice Thomas alludes to
the "intolerable atmosphere of terror" produced by cross burnings
in Virginia during the 1950s.' 2 4 Justice Thomas finds banning
cross burning unequivocally constitutional, but surprisingly seeks
to justify his conclusion by characterizing the latter as conduct
rather than as symbolic speech.125 Indeed, not only does that
characterization seem in direct contradiction to the unanimous
treatment of cross burning as speech in R.A.V., but also seems to
run counter to the Court's well-established jurisprudence affording protection to symbolic speech.'26
This brief review of R.A. V. and Black reveals doctrinal inconsistency or strain and a seeming underestimation of the severe
potential (cumulative) harm of hate speech on its targeted victims.
In view of this, the U.S. Supreme Court could have benefited-and
could certainly do so in future hate speech cases-from consideration of foreign judicial treatment of the subject. In this respect,
the Canadian Supreme Court decision in Regina v. Keegstra27
seems particularly instructive. In that case, the Court upheld as
123. See MARY J. MATSUDA, ET. AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993); CHARLES LAWRENCE, If He Hol-

lers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L. J. 431, 474-75 (tolerance of hate speech fosters unconscious racism in the marketplace of ideas).

124. 538 U.S. at 393.
125.
126.

Id. at 388.
See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).

127. [19901 3 S.C.R. 697.
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constitutional the criminal conviction of a high school teacher who
communicated virulent anti-Semitic hate speech to his students,
clearly inciting the latter to hatred of Jews.128 In many respects,
the Canadian protection of speech shares much with the American
one, relying on justifications from democracy, pursuit of the truth
and autonomy. 129 Unlike its American counterpart, however, the
Canadian Constitution places greater emphasis on multicultural
diversity and on social cohesion among diverse groups within the
polity."o While keeping this difference in mind, two points emphasized by the Canadian Court seem worthy of consideration
from the standpoint of U.S. jurisprudence. The first of these is the
observation-consistent with that of U.S. minority critics of current American hate speech doctrine"'3 -that the damage caused by
hate speech on its intended victims may be gradual and yet profoundly demeaning and eventually devastating. 13 2 The second observation, which the Canadian Court puts forth in knowing disagreement with prevailing American assumptions, is that in an era
of pervasive and sophisticated propaganda, hate speech can be
fine-tuned to play on the emotions and to bypass reason. Citing a
study commissioned by the Canadian Parliament, the Keegstra
Court stated:
The success of modern advertising, the triumphs of impudent
propaganda such as Hitler's have qualified sharply our belief
in the rationality of man. We know that under strain and
pressure in times of irritation and frustration, the individual
is swayed and even swept away by historical, emotional appeals. We act irresponsibly if we ignore the way in which emotion can drive reason from the field. 3
These two considerations do not necessarily militate in favor of
American hate speech jurisprudence emulating the Canadian example, but they seem particularly apt for prompting an inward
look by the U.S. Supreme Court in view of its current doctrinal
unease and the pleas of those who have disproportionately endured hate speech as members of minority groups that have been
targeted by hate propaganda. Should the line between incitement
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 713-14.
See ROSENFELD, supra note 58, at 261.
3 S.C.R. at 736.
See LAWRENCE, supra note 123, at 474-75.
3 S.C.R. 746-47.
Id. at 747.
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to racial hatred and to racial violence be struck down or further
blurred? Or, should it be firmly maintained or restored? Both the
American and the Canadian approach have strengths and weaknesses. 13 4 Be that as it may, whatever may eventually prove optimal in the American context, it appears that further self-inquiry
in light of similarities and differences with the Canadian constitutional approach could prove quite useful and productive as the
U.S. Supreme Court continues to confront hate speech cases in the
future.
III. SETTING A PROPER FIT BETWEEN CITATION TO FOREIGN
AUTHORITIES AND JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY

Absent xenophobia as the reason for refusal to look beyond one's
own borders, the preceding analysis indicates that the legitimacy
of references to foreign authorities in U.S. constitutional adjudication is above all a function of judicial philosophy. Moreover, from
the standpoint of the most restrictive philosophies, there is little
or no room for the references in question. In contrast, the more
expansive a judicial philosophy happens to be, the more it is likely
to carve out a very broad scope of legitimacy for such references.
That said, the use of references to foreign authorities by Chief
Justice Rehnquist in Glucksberg plainly suggests that even a relatively restrictive judicial approach may suffice for purposes of legitimating references to authorities beyond America's shores.'3 5
As the legitimacy of references to foreign authorities is parasitic
on the expansiveness of the corresponding judicial approach, it
becomes necessary to settle on the relevant judicial approach that
is best suited to determine when, why, how much, and for what
purpose, such references might be useful and legitimate. Before
proceeding any further, however, there are two important threshold questions which must be briefly addressed. First, in terms of
expansiveness, what range of judicial approaches are actually in
use in relevant U.S. Supreme Court constitutional adjudications?' And second, in light of present day constitutional controversies and changing circumstances, including the proliferation of
134. See ROSENFELD, supra note 58, at 281-82.
135. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 787 (1997).
136. 1 emphasize "relevant'" as there are presumably prescriptions under the U.S. Constitution, such as to be qualified to be President of the U.S. a person must have attained
the age of thirty five, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (1787), with respect to which looking to
foreign authorities would make little sense no matter how expansive one's judicial approach.
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transnational legal regimes that affect the U.S. directly or indirectly, how expansive must judicial approaches to the U.S. Constitution be to achieve a proper balance between efficiency, coherence
and legitimacy?
A.

On the Expansiveness of Operative JudicialApproaches in
U.S. ConstitutionalAdjudication and on the Optimal Expansiveness to Tackle ForeignAuthorities

As Professor Glendon observes, the use of foreign law is here to
stay and is likely to increase."a7 Already at present, all judicial
approaches, except those predicated on a conception of originalism
akin to that embraced by Justice Scalia, make use of foreign citations. Ironically, even Justice Scalia, who repeatedly professes his
preference for originalism, has felt obliged in cases like Roper and
Lawrence to have significant recourse to foreign authorities to buttress his dissents. Indeed, in addition to stressing that if he had
its way the Court would stick to originalism, Justice Scalia has
made liberal use of references to foreign authorities in an effort to
prove that those cited by justices in the majority are unpersuasive,
countered or overshadowed by others that Justice Scalia brings to
the attention of his fellow justices and to readers of the Court's
opinions.13 8 Taking together the references to foreign authorities
made by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Glucksbergl39 and the liberal
use of them by Justice Scalia clearly indicates that even judges
who view themselves as proponents of very restrictive judicial philosophies seem inevitably drawn to the fray."o In short, in response to the first question above, at least in the context of Due
Process cases, as a practical matter even the most restrictive judicial approaches in constitutional adjudication have regular recourse to references to foreign authority.
Reasonable minds may disagree about where to draw the line in
answering the second question above. For example, depending on
how exceptionalist and isolationist one may be, the scope of convergence between U.S. and foreign constitutional norms may be
137. See Glendon supra note 9, at 20.
138. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 626-27 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence v. Texas,. 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 787.
140. I leave aside how restrictive judicial philosophies such as those of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and of Justice Scalia actually are. Suffice it to point out that, at least in the eyes
of some, the philosophies in question tend to be much more expansive than their proponents would have us believe. See supra note 24.
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viewed as narrower or broader and the internationalization of
constitutional law beyond the borders of the U.S. as highly relevant or wholly irrelevant for American constitutional interpretation.14 ' In view of these apparently irreconcilable positions, it
seems best to circumvent them as much as possible in the course
of framing a principled approach suited to the discovery of the judicial philosophy with the optimal expansiveness needed to best
deal with new and evolving challenges. Most notably, the latter
include those posed by the globalization, transnational spread and
cross-fertilization of constitutional norms, as well as by the spread
of international norms with substantive content that is for all
practical purposes constitutional in nature, such as the individual
rights protected by the UN's International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights (ICCPR).14 2
A particularly attractive way to further the objective at hand, in
light of the consensus over the ubiquity and endurance of reference to foreign authorities in American constitutional adjudication, is by starting from a presumption that references to foreign
authorities are always warranted. This requires openness to inquiring into the relevance of both similarities and differences between the American and the foreign circumstances, materials, and
authorities brought to the attention of the adjudicator. Moreover,
it should be the burden of the party introducing the foreign material to point to the relevant similarities and differences in play
and to make out a prima facie case why these ought to be considered or factored in the adjudication of the American constitutional
issue in dispute.143 Thus far, under this proposal, introduction of
foreign materials should be treated in much the same way as that
of relevant judicial, legislative and administrative authorities
from one U.S. state in the course of adjudication in another U.S.
state. This is particularly true where the latter lacks a developed
jurisprudence on the subject, or where its existing precedents are

141.

See ROSENFELD, THE IDENTITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUBJECT, supra note 10, at

246-47 (discussing the internationalization of constitutional law and the constitutionalization of international law).
142. See Johanna Kalb, Human Rights Treaties in State Courts: The InternationalProspects of State ConstitutionalismAfter Medellin, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 1051 (2011).
143. Based on the discussion above, both Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia lay out a
prima facie case respectively for and against the relevance of foreign materials in Roper
and Lawrence. As we have seen, although Justice Scalia forcefully argues against the relevance of foreign materials, he nevertheless refers to some for purposes of refuting the relevance of others relied upon by Justice Kennedy.
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challenged as no longer adequate to deal with salient changes better accounted for in the jurisprudence of certain sister states.1'
There is, of course, one major difference between relying on materials of a sister U.S. jurisdiction and drawing upon foreign materials. The latter poses a problem of "translation" in both a literal
and a figurative sense that the former does not. 4 5 Leaving "translation" aside for the moment, as I will return to it below,' 46 it bears
emphasizing from the outset that adoption of a policy based on an
unlimited presumption of admissibility of references to foreign
materials has one major advantage: it allows for avoidance of the
at this point in time rather futile ideological debate over whether
foreign materials should be banned, avoided or else not cited in
U.S. constitutional adjudication. Aside from "translation," these
ideological battles can be more usefully fought within the actual
confines of adjudication, as are the differences in judicial philosophy (to which the battles in question are inextricably linked) bearing directly on the constitutional issues before the relevant court.
Furthermore, unlimited admissibility should cause no genuine
"opening the floodgates" concerns. In many cases, foreign materials would be irrelevant, clearly dwarfed by domestic considerations, inconclusive or unhelpful to any litigation party or to advancing any of the judicial philosophies that divide the judges involved. Under such circumstances, neither the litigants nor the
judges would have any reason to seek consideration of foreign materials. In other cases, these materials may be introduced, but
then swiftly discarded as inapposite.
Finally, even where foreign materials are admittedly relevant,
they need not automatically help either side of the judicial ideological divide. Although much of the discussion focused on Roper and
Lawrence links reliance on foreign materials with the more progressive justices, the examples set by Justice Scalia in the same
cases and by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Glucksberg suggest that
reference to such materials can also bolster the positions of more
conservative justices.
More specifically, Professor Glendon asserts that "foreign law
can never legitimately be used to support an interpretation of the
144. See Flanders,supra note 109.
145. See Richard Posner, Forward:A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 86 (2005)
("the judicial systems of the [US] are . . . readily accessible, while [those] of the world are
immensely varied and most of their decisions inaccessible . . . to our mostly monolingual
judges. . .").
146. See infra Part III.B (Foreign Materials and the Problem of "Translation").
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U.S. Constitution that is not otherwise grounded in this country's
Constitutional text, structure or precedent".147 Based on the preceding analysis, I disagree with Professor Glendon regarding precedents-as should be plain given our differences over the use of
foreign law in Roper and Lawrence-but agree with her with respect to text and structure, with one major qualification. Only
foreign law that could not weigh in except to contradict the text of
the Constitution, or to counter or undermine the distinct structures clearly prescribed by the Constitution, such as federalism
and the federal separation of powers, should be excluded outright.14 8 This latter qualification is consistent with the proper reference to foreign law in Printz, where the Court dealt with a
structural issue upon which the Constitution happened to be silent.149

Even consistent with the broader scope of legitimacy of uses of
foreign law deriving from the position I defend here, a large number of such uses would prove inappropriate, irrelevant or of barely
marginal value. It is of course obvious that when the text of the
Constitution is clear and determinative in a particular case, there
is no legitimate place for contradictory or inconsistent foreign authority. Moreover, the same conclusion would extend to instances
where the foreign authority at stake derives from a constitution
that is textually directly at odds with that of the U.S. For example, consider a judicial decision extolling the virtues and unifying
benefits of mandatory daily public school prayers conforming to
the creed of the country's majority religion that is consistent with
a constitution declaring the majority religion as the official state
religion.'
Clearly, citation to that decision could have no legitimate place in a U.S. case involving a controversy over the constitutionality of public school prayers under the Establishment

147. See Glendon, supra note 9, at 20.
148. This suggestion is not inconsistent with the position adopted above that all references to foreign authorities should be allowed to be introduced in the course of litigation.
Accordingly, the foreign law in question here should be "excluded" in the same sense that a
court would "exclude" by giving no consideration to domestic material that directly contradicted constitutional text, such as, for example, citation to a pre-Civil War court decision
vindicating slavery which squarely contradicted the text of the Thirteenth Amendment.

149. See Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 976-78 (1997).
150. See, e.g., Folgero v. Norway, 4 EHHR 47 (2008) (ECtHR) (assessing conformity with
the ECHR of a law of Norway mandating public school teaching of Christian religion and
philosophy in accordance with Evangelical Lutheran Faith propagated by the country's
constitutionally enshrined state religion).
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Clause.15' Similarly, a judicial decision about the great benefits of
unifying and centralizing all criminal law countrywide coming
from a unitary country such as France would have no place in a
U.S. case raising an issue of apportionment of powers relating to
criminal law.
Beyond these obvious examples, whether use of foreign law
would be legitimate, relevant or valuable should be left to the ordinary workings of the adversary system. Disagreements involving foreign authorities should be treated in the same way as those
concerning domestic law: domestic cases can be introduced as persuasive in their reasoning, their doctrinal approach or their fair
and judicious treatment of the conflicting interests fueling the litigation at stake; and empirical data and studies bearing on the legal issues can be presented for adjudication.' 5 2 In typical divided
decisions, the Court's justices disagree on a whole range of relevant matters ranging from the meaning of the constitutional text,
the proper interpretation of precedents, the particular fit of the
case to be adjudicated within various plausible lines of precedents,
and the relevance of certain data or fact patterns. As made manifest by the above-discussed disagreements between Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia in Roper and Lawrence, at the level of actual discussion of the similarities and differences between foreign
and domestic authorities, examples or experiences, the judicial
modus operandum appears to mirror quite closely that prevalent
in purely domestic settings.
B.

ForeignMaterialsand the Problem of "Translation"

One may object that even if one were in full agreement will all
the observations made above, one would have to reject most uses
of foreign law because of serious and even arguably insurmountable problems of translation. That is the position taken by Professor Glendonl53 and others.154 Translation does indeed pose serious
problems as what is not readily available to the American judge is
not only the foreign language in which certain non-U.S. materials
are couched, but also the legal, constitutional, social and cultural
context in which the materials in question are produced and in
151.

See Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370

U.S. 421 (1962).
152. On this last point, I am in full agreement with Professor Glendon.
153. See Glendon, supra note 9, at 14-15.
154. See Posner,supra note 145.
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which they remain firmly embedded. Moreover, problems of
translation are also responsible, at least in part, for the selectivity
and partiality associated with citations to foreign law which has
been forcefully decried by Justice Scalia.' On the one hand, selectivity is fostered because some otherwise pertinent foreign materials remain untranslated; on the other hand, conscious selectivity by the proponent of foreign materials is facilitated because
judges are less likely to be familiar with the full foreign legal
landscape than they are with their own domestic one.
While the translation problem is serious, it is not insurmountable, or more precisely, it is susceptible to adequate handling within the ambit of constitutional adjudication. In other words, consistent with the position I have elaborated above, translation problems should not lead to exclusion, but should be dealt with as best
as possible within the precincts of adjudication. To better understand the reasons for this suggested handling of the translation
problem it is instructive to draw an analogy to translation in literature.
Certain great works of literature, whether poetry or prose, cannot be given full justice in any translation into a foreign language.
Furthermore, even if such works could be translated fully satisfactorily, the foreign reader may miss out on some of the richness of
the work because of lack of familiarity with the relevant culture
and mores that are accessible to all native readers. Nevertheless,
even if the translated work is not the same as the original, it can
be appreciated as a great work of art even in translation. Shakespeare may not be the same in French or German translation as
he is in the original English, yet translations of his plays have
been studied, read and performed in non-English speaking countries for centuries. Presumably, what accounts for the endurance
and success of certain great works of literature in translation is
above all a combination of two factors: on the one hand, a profound
insight into facets of human nature or experience that tend to be
universal; and, on the other hand, adaptability for purposes of reconceptualization within the social context delimited by the culture and mores of the country into whose language the work has
been translated. Thus, for example, a novel about a great love
threatened by potentially tragic impediments rooted in the social
mores of the country in which it is set may well be appreciated by
a reader in a foreign culture. The latter may be unfamiliar with
155.

See Justice Scalia's dissent in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622-28 (2005).
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the social mores alluded to in the novel, and may not fully comprehend the import of these on the relationship at the center of
the narrative, but may nonetheless be able to similarly benefit
from the novel as would a native reader. The foreign reader can
imagine the novel's tragic dilemmas in terms of social mores
which could give rise to similar impediments within her own country.
In short, great works of literature are translatable and adaptable to remain effective in different linguistic and cultural contexts.
Moreover, the adaptability in question not only stretches over
space, but also over time. A contemporary English speaking audience at a performance of a Shakespeare play certainly does not
have the same familiarity with the language of the play and the
social mores it addresses as would have a sixteenth century audience. Nevertheless, the contemporary audience is able to adapt
and to reconceptualize so as to appreciate the play's greatness.
The analogy between translation and reconceptualization in literature and in the case of foreign law is of course subject to important qualifications and limitations. The most important of
these for present purposes is that presumably any topic can be
addressed by great literature and thus made of universal interest,
whereas the same is certainly not the case in law. Accordingly,
the analogy to literature applies to certain subjects in law, but not
to others. For example, the death penalty, the rights of homosexuals, and the right to choose one's death in the context of medicine's increasing ability to prolong life without improving its quality for the very old and the very ill, are subjects that pose similar
questions and legal and moral concerns in a large number of countries, if not virtually throughout the globe. Other subjects, in contrast, such as the legal and constitutional peculiarities of particular structural architectures, do not generally fit within the scope
of the analogy to literature. It is thus difficult to see how the particulars about apportionment of powers among the legislative and
executive powers in a parliamentary democracy such as the UK or
Germany would be of any use in adjudicating a separation of powers dispute between the U.S. President and Congress. With this
in mind, I now turn to the question posed and left open above:
namely when, why, how much, and for what purpose may references to foreign law be useful and legitimate in U.S. constitutional
adjudication consistent with the position I have elaborated above?

62
C.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 52

When, Why, How Much, and for what PurposeAre References
to Foreign Law Legitimate in U.S. ConstitutionalAdjudication?

When reference to foreign authorities might be relevant and legitimate depends on the dynamic between content and context. In
a case in which the subject matter for adjudication is the same as
that dealt with in the relevant foreign material, differences in context may be profitably downplayed through analogical reasoning
at a justifiable level of abstraction. Printz presents a good illustration of this: in spite of differences between U.S. and the foreign
federalisms referred to in Printz, the experience under the latter
on the issue of whether intrusion on the sovereignty of federated
entities is minimized through delegation of federal enforcement
obligations would seem helpful to a court facing the same issue
under U.S. federalism.'s In other cases, contextual similarities
may outweigh differences, thus significantly diminishing the risks
of material "mistranslation" when considering the foreign material. This situation is aptly illustrated by Lawrence in as much as
changing attitudes toward homosexual sex in the U.S. appear substantially similar to those in Western Europe."' Finally, in the
context of the growing body of laws of universal application in an
increasingly globalized world, certain legal norms, such as those
prohibiting torture or crimes against humanity, known as jus cogens, impose obligations on all countries even in the absence of
any applicable treaty obligations.'
In such cases, differences in
context ought to be largely disregarded. Consistent with this, the
universal prohibition of the death penalty for juvenile offenders,
except in the U.S. and Somalia, could argyably have become part
of jus cogens and thus proven persuasive in Roper at least to the
extent that such prohibition did not contravene a clear textual
U.S. constitutional provision to the contrary."5 '
The reasons why references to foreign authorities may be useful
and legitimate are manifold. Some of these may be technical and
related to constitutional adjudication as a practical exercise.
Thus, in Glucksberg, the Court dealt for the first time with the
156. See Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 976-77 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
157. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-73 (2003).
158. See Erika de Wet, The Constitutionalizationof Public International Law, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1209 (Michel Rosenfeld and
Andis Saj6 eds. 2012).
159. See supra Part II.B.1.
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question of whether a right to assisted suicide under certain limited circumstances ought to be recognized as a privacy and liberty
right under the Due Process Clause. Domestic sources revealed no
traditional protection of such right in the past, changing medical
conditions, and a need for compassionate minimizing of the suffering experienced by the terminally ill.6 o Under these circumstances, the Court was not prepared to end a difficult debate under
evolving medical options and fluctuating attitudes towards active
as opposed to passive end-of-life alternatives, by affording practically irreversible constitutional recognition to assisted suicide.
The fact that the Court could point to foreign authorities that had
already dealt with the issue overwhelmingly confirming the
Court's conclusion thus provided useful and legitimate reassurance that risk averseness against expansion of rights in this area
was the better available judicial course at the time of the decision.
In contrast, in Roper, the reason for referring to foreign authority was above all substantive. Did the fact that the U.S. stood virtually alone against the rest of the world on as momentous a legal
and moral issue as the death penalty for juvenile offenders, require a reexamination of, or perhaps even counseled a change in,
America's assessment of the proportionality of the punishment at
issue? Finally, yet another reason would justify recourse to foreign authority to better look inward in cases such as those involving hate speech discussed above."' Whereas no one would suggest
that America abandon its First Amendment exceptionalism, perhaps its current hate speech doctrine, which is at odds with what
it was in the mid-twentieth century, 6 2 ought to be reconsidered to
determine whether it would be better to alter it while remaining
within the bounds of exceptionalism.
How much and for what purpose references to foreign authori-

ties may be useful and legitimate seem to be closely related. On
one end of the spectrum, such references may be purely illustrative and reassuringly confirmative of a domestic constitutional
adjudication that stands exclusively on its own. That is what Justice Kennedy appears to intimate concerning his citation to foreign
law in Roper."' Consistent with the assessment of Roper in the
160. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Id. at 789-90 (Breyer, J., concurring).
161. See supra-PartII.B.5.
162. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1953) (5-4 decision upholding criminalization of hate speech as group libel).
163. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575.
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context of jus cogens that was suggested above,' however, the
reference to it locates it at the other end of the spectrum. On that
reading of Roper, the reference to foreign authority is crucial and
close to determinative-something that Justice Scalia seems to
have sensed given the vehemence of his dissent and of his misplaced and disproportionate attacks on the UK."'
Furthermore, Lawrence, for its part, seems to fall somewhere in
the middle of the spectrum. Particularly in view of Lawrence
overruling Bowers, its reference to the ECtHR's decision to hold
that any criminalization of consensual adult homosexual sex was
beyond the margin of appreciation can be fairly understood as furnishing more than mere confirmation or illustration." Indeed, in
addition of confirmation, the reference to Dudgeon provides an
additional reason which, together with the changing mores in the
U.S., buttresses the Court's decision to reverse itself so as to constitutionalize the right to engage in homosexual sex.
In closing, a brief word about the claim that reference to foreign
authorities should be banned or severely restricted because it is
bound to be selective, drawing upon materials that support the
user's position while ignoring or sweeping aside materials that
would boost the case against that user's position.
Selectivity is indeed inevitable, and it divides into a purely practical as against a substantive theoretical issue. Practically, not all
foreign authorities bearing on a given issue will be available due
to language barriers. That seems for the moment inevitable, but
certainly not significant enough to counsel against references.
There is a large body of foreign materials originally produced in
English as well as a large number of English translations provided
by foreign language courts, such as the German Constitutional
Court,"6 and by scholars for inclusion in casebooks and other materials.' Accordingly, except in a case where the number of decisions worldwide on an issue would be considered a key factor, it is
difficult to envisage why one would deprive courts of exposure to
164. See de Wet, supra note 158.
165. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 608, 627-28.
166. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
167. See
The
Federal Constitutional Court,
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT,
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/decisions.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2013).
168. The Georgetown Law Library has a comprehensive listing of foreign legal materials
translated into English. See Foreign and ComparativeLaw Research Guide, GEORGETOWN
LAW,
http://www.law.georgetown.edullibrary/research/guides/ForeignandComparativeLaw.cfn
(last updated Nov. 2013).
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the rich, varied jurisprudence of other countries representative of
a large number of countries, constitutional cultures, and approaches to constitutional issues solely because not all that is produced worldwide can be made equally accessible. Beyond that,
selective references due to the self-interests of parties to litigation
or to the ideological biases or judicial philosophy preferences of
judges can be adequately dealt within the confines of America's
adversary system of justice. In some cases selectivity may be successfully defended. Take, for example, Justice Kennedy's references to Europe rather than South America or Asia, which at the
time of Lawrence had jurisprudence contrary to that of Europe on
homosexual sex."'9 That selectivity could be persuasively justified
by showing that the United States' changing mores and constitutional culture were much more like those of Western Europe than
those prevalent in other parts of the word. On the other hand, if
Justice Kennedy had been selective because of a bias, then completing the picture as Justice Scalia endeavored to do in his dissent in Lawrence would be the best antidote and the best insurance against illegitimate abuses of selectivity. In short, the dangers posed by selectivity are best dealt with not by exclusion, but
by the ordinary workings of the adversary system.
CONCLUSION

Globalization impacts American constitutional adjudication in
many different ways and citations to foreign materials appear to
be here to stay. Professor Glendon is to be commended for stirring
the sometimes heated debate all too often veering to sloganeering
towards reasoned, rich, nuanced and measured analysis that goes
beyond generalities and offers a wealth of valuable insights into
the most relevant particulars. Whereas she appears to adhere to a
rather restrictive judicial philosophy, Professor Glendon nevertheless recognizes as legitimate certain references to foreign materials while counseling against certain others.
As made clear throughout the preceding analysis, I ultimately
disagree with Professor Glendon and advocate much wider acceptance of references to foreign materials within the ambit of
constitutional adjudication as practiced within the American adversary system of justice. In spite of my disagreement, however, I
have sought to build upon Professor Glendon's insights on particu169.

See 539 U.S. at 598-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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lars and emulated her nuanced approach to the dynamics between
identity and difference, which I have considered to be of central
importance in my previous work on the subject.'
As I have insisted throughout that differences regarding the legitimacy of citations to foreign law are parasitic on differences
with respect to judicial philosophies, some may be inclined to conclude that my disagreement with Professor Glendon boils down to
one over judicial philosophy. That, however, would be misleading.
for regardless of my own judicial philosophy, I have sought to
demonstrate that in spite of how restrictive a justice has professed
his or her judicial approach to be, in fact all justices who have addressed the issue have dealt with it in an expansive enough manner to legitimate recourse to foreign materials more broadly than
Professor Glendon has. The latter is a descriptive assertion, but
the preceding analysis also leads to a prescriptive claim about how
expansive a judicial approach ought to be in order to deal adequately with the challenges of an increasingly globalized world
with greater transnational cross-fertilization."' Jus cogens and
human rights covenants ratified with or without reservations by
the U.S. may require incorporation of foreign law in constitutional
adjudication, so long as this would not contradict the Constitution
itself as opposed to favored interpretations of it or constitutional
precedents, as I suggested in connection with Roper.17'
Furthermore, as evinced by Glucksberg and Lawrence, changes
in mores with important consequences for national constitutional
rights, and particularly such open-ended ones (consistent with
purely domestic interpretations of them) as the U.S. Due Process
clauses, may proceed on a transnational scale or in an atmosphere
of cross-national fertilization. Accordingly, barring consultation of
existing foreign authorities on point would needlessly deprive the
U.S. judge of a valuable resource that may be instrumental because of similarities or differences in helping her reach the most
appropriate result in view of all the relevant variables.
Finally, globalization tends to go hand in hand with balkanization.17 ' As globalization leads to increased exposure to, and con170. See Rosenfeld, Principle or Ideology, supra note 10.
171. For an extended discussion of these challenges, see Michel Rosenfeld, Rethinking
Constitutional Ordering in an Era of Legal and Ideological Pluralism, 6 INT'L J. CONST. L.
415 (2008).

172.

See supra Part III.C.

173. See ROSENFELD, THE IDENTITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUBJECT, supra note 10, at
234-35.
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frontation with, a great array of diverse cultures, it often results
in feelings of threatened identity and in tendencies toward retrenchment to one's own core cultural essentials.1 74 Under such
circumstances, constitutional values may be profitably garnered to
search for a proper equilibrium between inward and outward
tendencies. And because of its potential for aiding in both these
tasks-outwardly as in Lawrence and inwardly as suggested in
relation to the hate speech cases"'-references to foreign authorities ought definitely be made part of the available tools at the disposal of the constitutional adjudicator.
In the end, the prescriptive argument in favor of broad acceptance of references to foreign authorities is analogous to a
purely domestic prescriptive argument that can be made from the
standpoint of contemporary reality against an originalism, such as
that endorsed by Justice Scalia. As noted above, in both Roper
and Lawrence, Justice Scalia professes his preference for originalism, but engages Justice Kennedy in conformity with the latter's
more expansive judicial approach."' But if one imagined that
Justice Scalia's originalism were to become strictly followed by the
Court, it might well lead to consequences that would most certainly horrify most of its earnest proponents. Indeed, such originalism
would justify under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
the hanging of someone who had committed certain crimes at the
17
age of seven;"
the return to racial segregation under the Equal
Protection Clause;" and the destruction of the national economy
by confining the Commerce Clause to its eighteenth century pre17
industrial "original understanding.""
It may be much less obvious, but a similar argument can be made, from the standpoint of
contemporary reality, against overly restrictive judicial approaches as they would apply in the context of references to foreign law.
Finally, it bears reemphasizing that the prescriptive case for
expansive acceptance of references to foreign law is not made here
to dissolve America's distinct national and constitutional identity
into those of the larger world. The prescribed openness is urged
174. Id.
175. See supra Part II.B.5.
176. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608, 628 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 598 (2003).
177. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 589.
178. See discussion supra note 36.
179. Cf Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 69 (2005) (Justice Scalia concurring opinion approving federal regulation under the Commerce Clause of California non-commercially
produced marijuana for private non-commercial medicinal use in that state).
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instead in order for the U.S. to better balance its inevitable increasing openness to the world at large and its ever more urgent
need to preserve its core distinctiveness as a constitutional democracy and as a nation.

